INTRODUCTION

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For that reason he is a dangerous character. He is capable of too much independence. In the satellite armies men of this type have been less able to hold higher military posts than have either the behind-the-scenes politicians or the military technicians. The leaders of the World War II underground movement have been virtually eliminated from top jobs. The successful infantry commanders rise neither so fast nor so far as artillery men, engineers, or other technicians. The qualities of personal leadership may be better appreciated at lower levels which do not come within the purview of this study, but at the apex of the military hierarchy personal leadership is something which the Communists do not permit. When a new generation of officers take the top posts, the level of competence may rise and perhaps the problem of loyalty may have become less acute, but the new elite will not consist of dynamic leaders. It will be an elite which has grown up under the controls of the political department, the security police, and Russian observers. It may be an elite not prone to exercise strong personal leadership.

F. The Study and the Sample

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The above conclusions are based upon an analysis of biographical data concerning generals in the satellite countries. From the biographical data we tried to get light on three aspects of the structure of the satellite armies. (1) We have attempted to describe the process by which the satellite armies were taken over and communized insofar as this process involved changes in the kinds of men wielding power. (2) We have attempted to evaluate the breadth of background, education, and experience of those types of men who have finally gained power with a view to providing a basis for judgment of their potential effectiveness as leaders, and their prospective loyalty or discontent. (3) We have attempted to identify whatever fissures and lines of differentiation exist between segments of the armed forces.

To study these three topics we collected biographical data on general officers in five satellite countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and China.[8] In each case we compiled as many biographies of general officers as we could obtain, the criterion of selection being availability. In view of the difficulty of obtaining any data no more rigorous type of sampling was possible. We included general officers of the air forces and navies as well as the land armies.[9] When we could obtain the data we added as special subsamples general officers in semi-military police and security formations. In all of the satellite countries the special security troops, though under the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent in peacetime, are integrated with the armed forces and commanded by officers with military rank.

Ideally a study of military leadership should study not only gen-

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